Showing posts with label Hume (David). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hume (David). Show all posts

Thursday, July 09, 2026

Disagreeing with Massimo, but seeing where he comes from on Stoicism

 Near the end of a long discussion via Substack notes, about the nature of Stoicism, after I mentioned "ontological dualism," then re a response from him, made sure I was being understood correctly, he said:

I simply don't see that as true.

My response, which I didn't originally send? This:

We’ll agree to disagree on that, too, but I think the Logos is just as much a non-materialist entity, if you will, as karma is in Buddhism and Hinduism. I know they were determinists, just like Enlightenment Deists (even if they didn’t recognize it). I see it as similar to Aristotle’s “prime mover”; the Logos has to sit outside the material world, just like the Deist “wind up the clock” divinity.

It's how I've always understood Stoicism.

And that's true even if the Stoics didn't understand themselves that way. 

The conversation did fully open my mind, though.

I realize that part of why I have seen it this way is that, I see it as "not working" due to self-referentiality problems, the exact ones that Hofstadter, Gödel and Tarski have like liked to write about, only universe-wide. 

The way I see it is, we have a dilemma, and a real one, not a false one.

Accepting at face value Zeno's claim that Stoicism was monistic?

We either say he got that claim wrong, which allows the general Stoic edifice to remain, albeit with making Zeno look like a clueless metaphysician, or ...

We say that he was right on that Stoicism was monistic, and he had created a self-rotting edifice.

I don't know which is more "charitable."

I do know that either angle makes me realize far more than before how overrated Stoicism is in some ways. 

Of course, the central platform of Stoicism, the reason so many people are ga-ga over it via neo-Stoicism, is ethics. So, Stoicism's ethics are either part of that rotten edifice, and ditto for neo-Stoics, or they're dualistically based even as neo-Stoics don't realize this. If, per Hume's dictum (with preceding sentence) that:

We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.

Is at least more true than false, then a principle of living ethically according to reason and nature is more false than true. That's what got me started with Massimo; it's been a long, long time — before I became a secularist, to put it bluntly — that I've read seriously in Stoicism. I didn't realize that its use of "passion" has nothing to do with Hume's passions.

And, while I think Hume is not totally true here, just as he is not on "is ≠ ought," I do think on that, and this, both issues, he's more right than wrong. In the run-up to that dictum, he noted that most people of his day felt that passions needed to be the slave to reason, and so explained his inverse. See here. And, of that, he said:

I think, again, that this may not be 100 percent true, but it's more right than wrong. 

In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will.

The crux of what Hume is getting at comes a few paragraphs later, with this definition:

A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent.

Followed by this observation:

According to this principle, which is so obvious and natural, 'tis only in two senses, that any affection can be call'd unreasonable. First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it.

In other words, if a passion is justly formed, it's impossible to reason it away. 

I would go further, and state that claims that one can do so are itself a passion, though an ill-formed one. Of course, I like petard-hoisting.

I think devotees of all Hellenistic philosophies could learn from Hume. Even Cynicism made strong claims for human reasoning. At least it, unlike Stoicism and Epicureanism, rejects determinism.

Now, per Hume's other dictum, yes, his dictum on the passions and reason may not be totally true. After all, if "is ≠ ought," theoretically, we can reason our way beyond passions. But, can we? Beyond me going with petard-hoisting snark, per Hume's third bon mot about how we can never truly apprehend ourselves, we may never be able to so totally detach from ourselves as to truly abstractly reason with a bracketing — a phenomenological bracketing or epoche — of passions.

I see this to be more true the older I get, even as I wish it were not the case. 

That then said, related to that? Hume has a big problem here, and it's a personal one as a professional one, because he was a big practitioner of it.

It's called "motivated reasoning."

That then said, this doesn't let Stoicism off the hook, or the petard. It's easy to engage in — and to fling accusations of others engaging in — motivated reasoning. That in turn suggests again that actual reasoning is harder than St. David presents and much more so than Zeno claims. 

We very much aren't letting Stoicism off the hook. Per a later comment to Massimo:

So, whether Zeno was wrong in assuming that you can have a monist Logos, and ignoring all the self-referential issues that causes, which being literally universal in size, certainly satisfies Gödel et al on being a sufficiently large issue, or whether, if I’m charitable on accepting Zeno’s monistic stance, we then say per what I just said, and that theoretically means the edifice is rotten (yes, that’s a bit harsh, but I’m OK with it), there we are. 
I don’t see that as a false dilemma but a real one, and I know that, per the Cretan liars paradox and other things, self-referentiality problems were known to Zeno. 
As for the eternal recurrence? That of course means the Logos gets nuked along with everything else. 
Behind this, Zeno makes assumptions about the rationality of the universe, as well as of H. sapiens, that probably aren’t warranted. Can I hop in a Tardis and introduce him to non-local subatomic particles? 
Per Hume on Kant, I’ve been awakened from some sort of slumber.

And, that last sentence is as true as anything. 

This sets aside the issue of Stoicism being a hard determinist philosophy, and who exactly is trying to achieve ataxaria admidst such determinism. And yes, that last part was snark.

Saturday, January 07, 2023

Top blogging of 2022

An annual roundup of the most read blog posts of the past year. Not all were new to the past three months.

No. 1, "Libertarian pseudoskeptical pseudoscience," about Brian Dunning above all, but also the Novella brothers, Steve Pinker and others, from 2010, most certainly isn't new, but remains very true.

No. 2, "Do you have free will? Is that even a discussable issue?" also from 2010, is an extensive look at a critical area of philosophy.

No. 3, "Texas science ed director resigns over ID-creationist pressure" is even older, from 2007. I suspect it's gained new life due to the recent book bans plaguing public school and community libraries here in Tex-ass.

No. 4, "Antichrist vs the man of lawlessness vs the beast ..." was given new life by me when I posted this New Testament criticism piece to the Academic Biblical subreddit.

No. 5, "No true empiricist? Like no true Scotsman?" from this past year, was a takedown of British philosopher Julian Baggini, whether Scottish or not, over his alleged, but not actual, taking to task of Scottish philosopher David Hume over Hume's racism.

No. 6 is another oldie but goodie, "Say goodbye to History for Atheists." Note to Tim O'Neill: David Kertzer's newest book is yet more reason O'Neill needs to STFU on his attempts to defend the papacy against anti-semitism.

No. 7, "Did Biblical Edom exist? ...", from this past year, talked about the latest in biblical archaeology, and the latest in Israeli biblical archaeology, and the Zionism that appears to be behind some of that, and the Zionism that appears to be behind some of the reporting about it, as the ellipsis points lead you to read the full thing.

No. 8: "Coronavirus, philosophy, the noble lie, and the problem with Dr. Fauci (and his defenders)," written in the middle of 2020, and updated more than once, is indeed about "St. Anthony of Fauci," as I've taken to calling him, and his largely "Blue Anon" defenders, in the face of the big Platonic noble lie he told about masks early in the pandemic (and various less Platonic and less noble likes after that).

No. 9, "Split the log and I am there: Reflections on the Gospel of Thomas and beyond," was inspired by high-country hiking in the Rockies last summer. It includes photography of something that was part of a "secular spiritual experience," multilingual punning and more.

No. 10, "The great ahistoricity of Acts and radical thoughts about Paul's demise," is the third on this list from the past year and is exactly what its title says.

Thursday, March 17, 2022

Hume the not-so-great psychologist; once again a hypocrite?

A Twitter back-and-forth with Julian Baggini over various things David Hume has led me to in part question Hume's value as arguably the world's first modern psychologist. His "I can't apprehend myself" sounds so true when one tries to make an instantaneous grasp of who Hume is, as if the mind has a certain quasi-quantum fuzziness that can't be precisely held, or, to riff on both Anaximander and Zeno of Elea, as if it's a river which is always flowing halfway further to its destination while also never the same river.

The reality is that the "self" is a corpus of work, not a moment. To go back to the quantum world analogy, it's the entire diffraction pattern, not one individual wave-particle duad. 

Let's note his (in)famous comment in full:

“For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception…. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.”

The first thing I thought of when reading this again after hunting it up to get the exact quote?

The story about Hume being asked about the Problem of Induction by a lady, who wondered how he could fall asleep at night not knowing whether or not the sun would rise in the morning.

And, Hume essentially said, "I act as if."

Well, there's the hypocrisy part. Per what I said about the self being an ongoing corpus of work? Hume certainly did "act as if" in his personal life (other than when denying he wrote the Treatise). So, by his actions, if not his statement at the moment, he accepted the other side of the claim, not his own.

Of course, to further the petard-hoisting? The quote IS, as Hume students know ... from the Treatise! The book that Hume claimed he didn't write!

That said, the "bundle theory" behind this has its own additional problems. If all we can know about an object is a bundle of impressions, how can we know that that bundle of impressions is all we can know about it? To quote Hume against himself, the assumption that he makes could be called "divinity or school metaphysics" and another of his (in)famous quotes applied against himself:

“If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.”

Beyond that, Hume arguably stacked the deck, and for this we head back to quantum mechanics.

Maybe I can't see "particle X," but I can see the vapor trail left by its decay products and see if they match what's predicted. Likewise, maybe I can't see the self, but I can hear or see you state your political beliefs, your philosophical beliefs, your religious beliefs, your preferences in food and many other things.

These often do not stay rigid over a lifetime. The self of 20 years from now will likely not be the same as that of today, and the self of 20 years ago likely is not the same as the current one. (Example for me? As I write this, I think more and more that Hume needs to be shelved on the "overrated philosophers" list; 20 years ago, I couldn't conceive that.)

That said, the self of three months from now will likely be pretty close to the same as the self of today, close enough to be considered the same self, barring a Damascus Road moment. (Or a belief in p-zombies or something.) 

The problem gets worse. Most of Hume's highlights in philosophy, such as the whole Problem of Induction, started in the Treatise. It's true that he reworked some of them in some degree in later works. Nonetheless, if we took Hume's fictive anonymity claims as face value real, we should throw out what, one-third of philosophical thought attributed to him? And, that would officially move him into my "overrated philosophers" list.

So, again, as with Kant, Hume, or an overestimation of Hume, has awakened me from dogmatic slumbers.

Thursday, March 10, 2022

'No true empiricist' ... like 'no true Scotsman'?

First, sorry that I hadn't posted in a couple of weeks. But, late last week, I got easy material for two more posts, both long reads, and both about my "favorite" subject of the last year.

That's a shaggy dog, if you will, in that header.

I don't know if Baggini is Scots or not, but David Hume of course was, as well as being an empiricist. Was he a "true" empiricist? Is making claims about "true empiricists" today presentism? And, what other cans of worms have been opened up? 

Let's dive in.

Baggini, in a back and forth on Twitter about whether he cuts David Hume too much slack on his racism (he does, I say), made this claim:

To which I independently Tweeted:

What Baggini seems to be claiming is that science, philosophy. or both, are free of bias. Anybody who's read the Great Barrington Declaration knows that's laughable.

Besides, if empiricism is free of bias today, why wasn't it so in Hume's lifetime?

Oops! Baggini, as he has with Hume, is trying to use the hand-waving of presentism, and I just hoist him by his own petard.

Yeah.... I quote-tweeted his tweet rather than doing a second independent response in a thread to my first tweet. So sue me.

And, he responded, claiming the petard's on me. 

So, NOT quote tweeting him, my final take:

I.E., I stand by what I said. M-W's shorter definition confirms me in that.

That said, from what I've read elsewhere, I think that Baggini, like Dan Kaufman, gets Hume's Skeptical history wrong.

Simple and correct answer on this is by straight chronology: Treatise Hume, a Pyrrhonist; post-Treatise Hume an Academic. Per Mossner's bio, as I noted in my review, that's why Hume's bottom line recourse when being called out as a Pyrrhonist was to saiy, "I didn't write the Treatise."

In reality, this, combined with my noting that Hume was a "trimmer" in many ways, which Baggini halfway admits in one piece, though without ever using the word "trimmer," shows that Hume as a philosopher should perhaps be moved into the overrated camp.

It also brings into question Hume's value as arguably the world's first modern psychologist. His "I ca't apprehend myself" sounds so true when one tries to make an instantaneous grasp of who Hume is, as if the mind has a certain quasi-quantum fuzziness that can't be precisely held, or, to riff on both Anaximander and Zeno of Elea, as if it's a river which is always flowing halfway further to its destination while also never the same river.

The reality is that the "self" is a corpus of word, not a moment. To go back to the quantum world analogy, it's the entire diffraction pattern, not one individual wave-particle duad.

Finally, Julian, another petard? If Hume IS a "thorough" racist as you claim (and as I agree, while still noting you undercut yourself), then can you really write a whole book about how Hume can teach us about being human? ONLY if in terms of medieval theology's "via negativa." (And, that wouldn't just be on Hume as a negative mirror on how to not be a racist. It would also be Hume as a negative mirror on how not to be a poseur, a trimmer and other things.)

==

More here on Hume's racism, which also notes that Hume believed in polygenesis.

Saturday, January 15, 2022

Top blogging of 2021

 Not all posts are from the past year, but these were the most popular by readership in the past year.

No. 1? Remains my calling out of Anthony Fauci for telling Platonic noble lies about mask-wearing or not, back in 2020. (He'd later tell other lies, first semi-noble, then totally mundane ones.

No. 2? My decade-ago calling out of the likes of Brian Dunning and Michael Shermer for engaging in libertarian pseudoscience pseudoskepticism.

No. 3? It's interesting it's trended this high, but it's a blog post of mine from last year about an Atlantic Monthly contributor, and (former?) regular Atlanta Journal-Constitution reporter, for the weirdness, if you will, of his story about when he stopped (for a while) being an "ambulance chaser" because his own wreck made him an ambulance needer. My piece covered "PTSD, journalism, accidents, existentialism." The first three were involved; the fourth was my angle of entry.

No. 4? Veering to critical religion — not critical exegesis of texts, but criticism of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and all the hypocritical dirtiness in its closure of Concordia University-Portland (with the denouement still ahead in the snarls of multiple lawsuits).

No. 5? My untangling of the "Young Hume" vs "Old Hume" on Pyrrhonism and more. Part of a serious of extended posts inspired by David Harris' critically acclaimed, yet actually somewhat spotty, recent biography.

No. 6? In which I told Jesus mythicists that Nazareth is real, and more to the point, was real 1st Century CE.

No. 7? The later semi-noble lies of Fauci got examined, in a psychological take on him and a sociological one on tribalist Democrats.

No. 8? A relatively recent one, showing how Harvey Whitehouse's ideas on the evolution of religion, by not being grounded in good philosophy of religion, jumped the shark. Sadly, it appears that the likes of a Scott Atran, by heading down a similar ev psych-based road, may also be "jumping."

No. 9? I pretty thoroughly deconstructed David Graeber's posthumously coauthored new book. (I even more thoroughly deconstructed its political angles at my main blog.)

No. 10? A philosophy and philosophy of science question is wrestled with: How do we define "life"?

Thursday, July 15, 2021

Top blogging of April-June

Unlike at my main blog, I don't think it's productive to do a top blogging of the month post.

But, top blogging of the quarter, instead of only an annual roundup? Why not?

So, here goes the first run.

No. 1? An oldie but a goodie from a year ago. St. Anthony of Fauci’s Platonic “noble” lie about masks.

No. 2? PTSD, journalism and existentialism, about a weird piece in Atlantic from an ambulance-chaser reporter.

No. 3? The other Platonic lies of Fauci.

No. 4? “Once more on Hume and slavery,” part of a series deconstructing his thought on Africans and other things.

No. 5? Libertarian pseudoskeptical pseudoscience is about Brian Dunning above all, then about Michael Shermer, then about Skeptics™ in general and even older than Fauci takes. 

No. 6? It's kind of related to No. 5. Skeptatheism, fossilized looks at fossilization in Skeptics™ and Gnu Atheist movements.

No. 7? Martin Luther vs. Charles V, part of my Reformation 500 series.

No. 8? Talking about Jeff Kloha and Hobby Lobby in my personalized connection to Museum of the Bible’s Dead Sea Scrolls forgery.

No. 9? A non-gnu atheist has thoughts from seeing his first May Crowning.

No. 10? In response to Zionists and others, the true meaning of Hanukkah.

Saturday, June 12, 2021

Once more on Hume and slavery: ancient vs modern and Humean lies

In his attempts to make light of, ignore, explain away, or whatever, race-based modern (in his time) slavery, David Hume, in The Populousness of Ancient Nations, also hints at an old trope:

"But classical slavery was WORSE!"

That's not a direct quote, but it is the old trope to a T.

I touched on this in my original main post on Hume and racism and his infamous Note, but this needs to be looked at further, because it t'aint necessarily true. In fact, a closer look at this essay of Hume's shows both that claim and one other are basically lies.

First, was slavery of classical antiquity sometimes more brutal than that of 1700s Virginia and the Carolinas, or even than on the Caribbean plantations like the one (maybe more we don't know about?) whose sale Hume brokered. 

Yes, indeed.

Were punishments worse?

Yes.

Modern slaves weren't crucified after revolts, though they were usually put to death. 

But? Per Hobbes, life in general was nasty, brutish and short, moreso in 100 CE than in 1770. (On the other hand, the amount of crimes for which one could be executed in Humean Britain was no day at the beach. And, in the U.S., post-slavery Jim Crow lynchings were arguably as barbaric as crucifixion.

The greater amount of slave revolts might be support for Greco-Roman slavery being more brutal. Or, it might be support for the fact that ancient plantations having at least as many slaves as the Caribbean and more than the mainland British colonies, but like them on a mainland, not small Caribbean islands, made escape somewhat more tempting. Or, it might be support for the idea that guns let modern slaveowners have even greater control over their charges.

The reality is that, in many ways, ancient slavery was not as bad.

First, Rome, especially, made manumission fairly easy. Oppose that to the U.S. colonies and states, where state laws from the late 1700s up to the Civil War continued to further and further restrict owners' right to manumit their slaves.

Second, social mobility for freedmen was MUCH greater in ancient Rome than the modern European colonial lands. There's a couple of reasons for that. One, slavery being even more common meant less stigma attached. Slavery not being race-based in antiquity meant there was even less stigma attached.

Third, many slaves being literate, and in general, there being no government laws against them being educated, meant that, not only were they not burdened by stigmas, they were more in control of their own destinies once freed. (Now, this was not the case for all slaves, of course, but for many, it was.)

AND?

I have little doubt that David Hume the professional historian as well as student of ancient philosophy knew these things himself, and was being disingenuous if I'm polite and a liar if I'm not.

That said, Hume is disingenuous from the start about Europe of his day "abolishing slavery." Scottish miners, colliers in specific, were subjected to the functional equivalent of slavery in Hume's day. (It wasn't a legally heritable slave status,  In addition, many upper-crust Scots owned a black house slave or two at his time.

Thursday, March 25, 2021

Young Hume vs Old Hume: The passions and more

Was there a difference between "young Hume" and "old Hume"? Namely, did he actually repudiate the Treatise, or close to that?

I side with Mossner and others among older Hume interpreters and say yes, above all on the issue of the passions, but also on the radicalness of his skepticism. Per the link, I've already talked about the latter, and why we can't call later Hume a Pyrrhonist.

Some trends in modern neuroscience side with young Hume.

GQ, in a good, and in-depth, interview with Lisa Feldman Barrett, touches on this. A key takeaway, from the first "half chapter" of her new book, is the hot new idea in neuroscience — that, contra "old Hume" and 90 percent of thinkers before 2000, the brain did not develop "for" either thinking or feeling or other things as much as it did for running a body budget.

I would disagree with stress being a "withdrawal" from the body budget. But, the general idea that emotions — including deeper passions, though not called such by here — control the body's budget is interesting. (I also think she's probably wrong on some of the details in her ideas of how a body's budgetary system works.)

So, the Hume of the Treatise could perhaps be called an "emotional Pyrrhonist," then? He was more right than wrong. And, in a sense, anticipated some 19th-century and beyond trends in philosophy. But, of course, this risked him being considered seriously.

But, it didn't have to be that way.

He had the Dialogues published posthumously. Why not turning back to at least some ideas in the Treatise?

As he did not, it means we must take his rejection of it seriously. And, must affirm there was a rejection, contra Harris and many other Hume scholars of today's generation. 

On the passions, if Hume had continued, even gone further, down the road of the Treatise, this essentially would have meant rejection of large chunks of Enlightenment ideas. And, that wasn't happening. I think Hume recognized this. So, along with simply wanting to avoid the bad press, he wanted to distance himself from most the ideas advanced there. Surely, as part of this, now that he had become "established," he recognized that letting the Treatise, or any ideas from its nose, back under the tent would have meant the disintegration of the idea of "le bon David" among men of letters in general, and more specifically, among the likes of the French philosophes. Quelle horreur, some of them might have wondered if some of his early thought was akin to that of Rousseau!

That's why he told Beattie and other Scottish common sense philosophers it was unfair to bring up the Treatise and hold it against him, because he had written it anonymously knowing it would be controversial even before it was launched.

With this, I have finished my series of pieces on Hume, as influenced by James Harris' semi-new bio of Hume. I began with a "prequel" piece on refuting the charge of presentism as a way to try to pretend away Hume's racism (and Aristotle's and others' sexism). That piece links the whole set of pieces on Hume.

Thursday, March 18, 2021

Is David Hume just a bundle in my mind? Or just a petard hoisting?

 I'm of course talking about his bundle theory of impressions.

I've often called Hume the first modern(ish) psychologist. He was on more solid ground than a Freud or Jung, at least, and definitely for the limitations of his day.

But?

He was partially right about the self, but not totally, and not close to right on why. The bundle theory is weak. Hume flirts with the land of Berkeley, though he would never admit it. In reality, something like Dennett's subselves is probably a much better explainer of both how and why we don't have a unified, consistent self.

Beyond that, of course, Hume was operating from the typical "blank slate" paradigm of British empiricists. And, of course, this is wrong. Human minds evolved to, on average, have and develop certain conceptions and preconceptions. A baby's brain isn't blank, and while a current subself may be just whichever current set of conceptions and preconceptions are in the saddle, all subselves have those.

Let's look at modern neuroscience. 

GQ, of all places, has a surprisingly good, and in-depth, interview with Lisa Feldman Barrett. A key takeaway, from the first "half chapter" of her new book, is the hot new idea in neuroscience — that, contra "old Hume" and 90 percent of thinkers before 2000, the brain did not develop "for" either thinking or feeling or other things as much as it did for running a body budget.

While I think it can be overblown, there is a generally good core there. That's why the brain has those conceptions and preconceptions — they save energy, and the brain itself is of course the hungriest part of the body.

Along with conceptions and preconceptions come predictions, which also save brain energy.

She noted that some of these come from social learning and that to some degree, "predictions come from a world that curates you." To riff on Hume, thus, we're only not a blank slate, but we're also not in a blank classroom.

However, beyond modern neuroscience, there's a more elemental problem when we look at Hume as Hume on this issue, in his own words.

It's called "petard hoisting," and one of his most famous statements, known in general outline by a fair amount of the non-philosophical world, is a dandy on this.

“For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception…. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.”

As they say on Twitter? #Boom! 

In essence, to riff on Gertrude Stein's bon mot about Oakland, Hume is saying there's no "I" at the core of "my/him-self."

BUT? He says that:

“For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other …”

Who? Who's this "I," le bon David, if you're just a perception, or a bundle of them, and nothing more?

Now, defenders of Hume would probably say we should treat this the same way as we do his thoughts on causation. Problem? He never really gives the indication of doing that himself in this case. Nooo ... since that was from the Treatise? He just repudiated it along with the rest.

Now, why?

Here, other than "atheism" for a denial of a permanent self being seen as equivalent to denying the soul, I think it was the other big issue leveled at Hume from the publication of the Treatise to the end of his life

Pyrrhonism, in a word.

Being a skeptic, in general, was problematic enough in his day and age.

Being seen as a Pyrrhonic, not an Academic, Skeptic, within the two schools, was far worse.

In the past, I got into arguments with Dan Kaufman, a philosophy prof in Missouri, over what type of Skeptic, to go with the capital for the schools, Hume was, or if he even knew the difference.

Well, to the degree other men of letters and clergymen distinguished "Pyrrhonic" from "Skeptic," they did, and certainly Hume did.

So, my ideas that he was "confused or ignorant on this?

Not at all.

Rather, this was another part of him repudiating the Treatise — he was repudiating any Pyrrhonic-type skepticism.

This may also be why, in his essays on four schools of philosophy in his "Essays Moral and Political," the essay "The Sceptic" doesn't discuss the Academic-Pyrrhonic difference.

Thursday, March 04, 2021

Le bon David: David Hume as litterateur

James Harris refers several times to the idea of Hume as "le bon David." He and E.C. Mossner both paint him as being a "man of letters" as much or more than a philosopher, so let's just use the French there.

Two questions.

First, just how much was Hume "le bon," in dealings with Rousseau, James Beattie and others, and how much is this a legend?

Second, was he always that good as a litterateur? That's both in terms of his writing style and how much he, at least in materials not for public consumption (Burn this!) had his own sharp elbows at times.

Let's jump in.

First, Hume is without a doubt one of the most readable philosophers past or present. It's not just that he's easy to understand, overall, on most more technical stuff. Or that, even for his era, he's not that "technical" of a philosopher.

Especially as shown in things like his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, he writes well. He's readable.

On the other hand, if one looks at things like some of his essays, at times he seems to be a "trimmer." As in, a writer of puff pieces. Oh, they have a certain amount of fluff style, or the 1700s England equivalent. But, they're fairly superficial.

Another place where the "litterateur" is fluff without a lot of substance? Slavery and related issues. Back to that again, yes.

Second, some of Hume’s alleged “anti-slavery” comments actually come off as stuff similar to what Stephen Douglas said about slavery’s potential in the High Plains and the West — simply utilitarian claims about where (or in Hume’s case, for how much longer as well as where) slavery would prosper. Douglas otherwise had no moral problems with slavery and Hume, to me, at best shows moral diffidence.

Plus, when it comes to the repudiated "Treatise" (and he DID repudiate, contra Harris, and I'll have a separate piece on just that), Hume had a thin skin. No other way to put it.

To undercut Harris’ (and Hume’s own) claim that “le bon David” never replied to critics?

Back to his 1777 Advertisement:

“Yet several writers, who have honoured the Author's Philosophy with answers, have taken care to direct all their batteries against that juvenile work, which the Author never acknowledged, and have affected to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over it: A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and a strong instance of those polemical artifices, which a bigotted zeal thinks itself authorised to employ.”

Methinks he doth protest WAY too much.

Thursday, February 18, 2021

Contra Julian Baggini, on Hume, two wrongs don't make a right or justify a Platonic noble lie

Although already refuted by my piece on David Hume as racist, and refuted on presentism?

Julian Baggini goes in the tank for Hume. Undercutting him?

And? Undercutting even more Sir Tom Devine, the present-day Scottish historian he cites, claiming there was no push for abolition in Scotland in 1762, the time of his sugar plantation intervention, which he claims is in a "purported" letter?

In history we teach our students not to indulge in the intellectual sin of anachronistic judgement, i.e. never to impose the values of today on those of the past. In 1762, the year of David Hume’s reported letter on the plantations, there is no evidence that any groups in Scotland opposed chattel slavery in the colonies. The surge of abolitionism and widespread horror at man’s inhumanity to his fellow man only came later. In that sense, Hume was a man of his time, no better and no worse than any other Scot at the time.

Scotland was part of the UK, and was so for Hume's entire live. In addition, by this time, Hume had lived in London, and on the continent. (Amazing how the "world" of Enlightenment letters & ideas can be so selective.) Abolition was a happening thing in England; James Oglethorpe founded Georgia to be slavery-free, and for humanitarian reasons, before the original version of Hume's footnote.

And, Beattie and his mentor Thomas Reid? SCOT! 

AND? He's arguably wrong about "no evidence that any groups ..." Per that "happening thing" link from Wiki (which has a footnote, so shut up):

Some of the first freedom suits, court cases in Britain to challenge the legality of slavery, took place in Scotland in 1755 and 1769. The cases were Montgomery v. Sheddan (1755) and Spens v. Dalrymple (1769). Each of the slaves had been baptised in Scotland and challenged the legality of slavery. They set the precedent of legal procedure in British courts that would later lead to success for the plaintiffs. In these cases, deaths of the plaintiff and defendant, respectively, brought an end to the action before a court decision could be rendered.[8]

Also, per the same link, John Wesley, who created this organized group called "Methodism," started writing against slavery on moral grounds two years before Hume died. 

More here on those freedom suits and related issues. More at this link. Both of them mention three freedom suits, not two. The second link mentions how individual Scots helped fugitive slaves. I would suspect that there was at least word-of-mouth organizational effort behind this.

Both links also have more information about the profitability of slave trading and island plantation ownership to individual Scots and to Scotland as a whole. Given that Hume, in some ways a precursor to Adam Smith on modern economics, wrote a lot about economic issues, I suspect he knew all of this himself.

Related to this, Baggini wants to make "presentism" a non-absolute descriptor. I reject that. Even if I accepted that the idea of presentism, empirically, should be defined in majoritarian terms, per the logical side, specifically, psychological logic, I would reject his claim that the minority side in 1700s Scotland was so small that we can essentially ignore it.

I am tired of this. I've already told Baggini on Twitter that I'm going to do a new post. Basically, I see things like this as a version of Platonic noble lies, based on ideas that cancel culture or whatever is so evil all tools in opposition to it are fair game.

As for the British involved with the tower's de-naming not calling out China more? Two wrongs don't make a right. And, he either knows that, or if he doesn't, he's pretty appalling as a philosopher. The modern world would call this whataboutism or something.

That said, trying to do a Robert Wright on Jesus, in a book he wrote last year, and find that Jesus' calls to "renounce one's self" have secular value when removed from Jesus' metaphyics, makes me think he is at least in the vicinity of appalling.

==

And, per a discussion on MeWe, sorry, but this DOES, if not detract from Hume's (or Kant's, Locke's or Voltaire's) work in general, at a minimum, it brings it under heightened scrutiny. I'm sorry that it doesn't for you.

==

Update, May 28: Via Massimo, Baggini continues this by, to put it politely, offering an overly charitable interpretation of Hume's socio-political bigotry.

Update, March 3, 2022: In light of that brief update above, it should note that this time, Baggini has responded when poked with the Twitter stick.

And, yes, he may in this piece call Hume a "thorough" racist, but, given that in the Medium piece above, he also claims that this was "casual" racism and essentially a "one off,) and and that it's "presentism" to judge him by today's standards (and wrongly makes those claims, as shown)? 

"What the right hand giveth, the left taketh away."  

Or, to go Shakespearean in another way?

"Methinks you doth undercut yourself too much."

Seriously, how can one be a "thorough" racist and yet a "casual" or "one-off" racist???

Beyond that, in elsewhere discussing "Populousness of Ancient Nations," I note that Hume engages in deck-stacking on the issue of ancient vs modern slavery. There's nothing casual or one-off about that.

==

More here on Hume's racism, which also notes that Hume believed in polygenesis.

Thursday, February 04, 2021

Hume, racism and bigotry, and rank hypocrisy

Per my presentism blog post and my post about James' Harris' 2015 bio of David Hume, he was a racist. But, how bad of a racist was he? After all, he reportedly opposed slavery, did he not?

Well, we're going to take more of a look at that.

First, in "Of National Characters," where Hume's now-infamous footnote about "The Negros" occurs, he engages in extensive ethnic and nation-state stereotypes of many people. (It includes some at least mildly anti-semitic items among those.)

Second, in reaction to a 1770 book by James Beattie, he changes the original footnote, which also slurred American Indians, to focus just on blacks.

Third, given the footnote, and the essay, were originally written in the early 1750s, I venture Hume had never seen an African in person. He'd briefly been in Paris, then to Vienna and Turin; neither the Hapsburgs nor the House of Savoy were major slaving countries. And, he'd surely never seen an American Indian, either.

AND? Hume undercuts any alleged scientific support for his own racism with this from that essay:

“The manners of a people change very considerably from one age to another.” 

The whole essay is not long, but given how known the footnote is, treating it in two pages is insufficient. Worse yet, Harris treats the footnote — only in a footnote! And, it gets yet worse from there.

First, in that footnote, Harris never actually addresses Hume’s racism. Second, he claims that Hume’s posthumous sharpening of the footnote was NOT in response to Beattie.

I simply find this untenable. I know WHY he claims that. To admit otherwise would be to question Hume’s own claim to not respond to his critics.

I can’t find a full version of Aaron Garrett’s piece cited, for free, online. But, Harris himself doesn’t give a summary of WHY he thinks Garrett has refuted Immerwahr’s claim that Hume WAS responding to Beattie. I do have this link to a free page, which gives an intro to Garrett's thought, here. He raises the anti-slavery claim to try to defend Hume, as well as Hume's comment that climate does NOT seem to affect national characteristics. But, see below.

While correlation does not necessarily imply causation, Beattie’s attack on Hume’s racism was the only attack we know of in Hume’s lifetime that was publicly maed. In addition, the fact that Beattie offered empirical evidence of culture, civilization etc on behalf of several specific American Indian groups, but not on behalf of Blacks, further sharpens the idea that Hume WAS responding to Beattie.

Also, on Hume allegedly being anti-slavery, which makes his racism more a head-scratcher? First, Harris DOES note that, per a letter to Francis Seymour Conway, 1766, he appeared to be acting as a broker for the sale of plantations in Grenada. Shades of Locke! And, if Garrett didn't know that, it undercuts him. If Garrett did know that, and ignored it, it undercuts him.

Counter this, some may cite “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations (1752, 1777) “ I would grant this as a partial though not total defense. He talks about the “American colonies” still having slavery … while ignoring the British Caribbean islands. And, his revision of that original footnote made it worse, by making it into specifically anti-Black racism.

Second, some of Hume’s alleged “anti-slavery” comments actually come off as stuff similar to what Stephen Douglas said about slavery’s potential in the High Plains and the West — simply utilitarian claims about where (or in Hume’s case, for how much longer as well as where) slavery would prosper. Douglas otherwise had no moral problems with slavery and Hume, to me, at best shows moral diffidence.

But, his doing so undercuts the whole legend of le bon David, which is a key thesis of Harris.

AND, it gets worse YET. Per the New York Review of Books’ review:

“As he acknowledges, readers who are primarily interested in Hume’s life should start with the biography by a late American scholar, Ernest Campbell Mossner, which was first published in 1954. Mossner’s life of Hume is suffused with an affection for its subject that, according to Harris, sometimes obstructs a “properly dispassionate” examination of the facts.”

Rather, in this instance, it is Harris who appears to have exactly such an affection for Hume that obstructs examination of the facts.

The reality is, as noted above, that “Of National Characters” is nothing more than a slapdash assembly of stereotypes of prejudice and bigotry. And, Hume, the supposed grand supporter of the science of experiment, palmed this all off. In reality, seeing something like this, written at the tail end of the first set of essays, and not revised later, should rather lead us to question many other claims of Hume’s about human nature. They may turn out to be right. Or they may not. 

In other words, we should refer to a Herbert Spencer phrase, beloved in preaching but rarely in practice, by Alcoholics Anonymous:

There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance—that principle is contempt prior to investigation.

That's exactly what Hume did. 

Besides, re that footnote itself? In the body of the essay, he talks about how easy it is to get Negros drunk and take advantage of them.

Now, the footnote, post-Beattie version:

I Am apt to suspect the negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient Germans, the present Tartars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negroe slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.

There you go.

And, here's the broader pro-white background of the original version of the footnote, pre-Beattie:

I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites.

There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences.

This makes things worse, in some ways.

First, it shows how Hume sharpened his racism to be anti-Black.

Second, per Immerwahr, quoted in the piece, it shows the deliberateness of Hume's racism, contra Harris, who claimed it was only something minor.

Third, contra some of his defenders, it would at least leave Hume open to the charge of polygenesis. See Spencer's quote, above. And, yes, I've heard the claim that Hume didn't believe in that.

These people claim that Hume rejects polygenetics in the revised version. Does he? Remember, this comment: "Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men," is in both versions. At a minimum, it undermines the claim that Hume thought Black inferiority was primarily a matter of cultural environment.

Third, did Hume make the Chinese into "Yellow Aryans"? Or reject them entirely? And, India?  Answer: He ignores them.

Fourth, "Populousness of Ancient Nations," in claiming modern economies, unlike ancient Rome, weren't dependent on slavery, ignores American tobacco (cotton not yet a big deal) and Caribbean sugar in British island colonies — including at plantations whose sale Hume helped broker.

Finally, from that same piece, there's this bit, with Hume either doubling down on anti-Spencerian willful ignorance, or else entering the realm of public relations agent for Grenadine planters:

What else is there to say?

This.

It is computed in the West Indies, that a stock of slaves grow worse five per cent. every year, unless new slaves be bought to recruit them. They are not able to keep up their number, even in those warm countries, where cloaths and provisions are so easily got. How much more must this happen in European countries, and in or near great cities? I shall add, that, from the experience of our planters, slavery is as little advantageous to the master as to the slave, wherever hired servants can be procured. A man is obliged to cloath and feed his slave; and he does no more for his servant: The price of the first purchase is, therefore, so much loss to him: not to mention, that the fear of punishment will never draw so much labour from a slave, as the dread of being turned off and not getting another service, will from a freeman.

First, Hume the economist knows that when a "manufacturer" has an inexhaustible supply of "feedstock" for the "manufacturing process," it will be abused. Just.Like.This. So, they accept a 5 percent loss and await the next slave ship. They're not TRYING to keep them up more.

Second, hired servants can leave abusive jobs. (Theoretically; in economic downturns, maybe they can't.)

Third, slaveowners aren't obliged to ADEQUATELY feed and cloathe slaves.

Fourth, from the background of the whole piece, which talks about slavery in antiquity? It was more barbarous in some ways. But, manumission was easier, and it wasn't based on racism.

I'll add that this paper by Glen Doris has — in some ways — a broadly similar critique of "Populousness of Ancient Nations" and is very worth a read. Doris also says that defenders of Hume try to make this essay do work it just wasn't designed to do.

At this point — since Hume understood economics almost as well as friend Adam Smith — we're in the territory of rank hypocrisy.

I'll end there, noting that Harris is lucky, between deliberate overlooking by bracketing, and related items, that I didn't two-star him, rather than three-star.

And, per that "broader" link, I'm sure we could find rank hypocrisy along with racism in Locke, Kant, Voltaire, etc.

That said, Hume — and his footnote — still have defenders, like this piece here, from a person who is a Black Yale philosophy grad student. Johnson claims that Hume was writing "before racism existed as a concept."

Tosh.

Per Emmanuel Eze, the real question is: If Hume was not a racist, why did he feel compelled to keep in the footnote, and even sharpen it? (Eze also notes that Beattie criticized other parts and aspects of "Of National Characters." Indeed:

The fact that it survived Hume's multiple revisions and remained part of the Essays and was publicly defended from criticisms invites one not to dismiss this lengthy addition as marginal to Hume's thought but rather to determine why he might have felt it needed to be added in the first place, revised, and critically defended in what is now its definitive version. Relevant specific questions would be: why, of all other possible places (I have in mind, for example, a comparable essay "Of the populousness of ancient nations"), was the footnote added here?

Unfortunately, the free look truncates there. But given that I have also referenced "Populousness," these are all good questions.

Related? Immerwahr, mentioned above, talked about Hume's "philosophical racism," and Eze and other respondents said, why say "philosophical"? Indeed, to me, this comes off as "casual racism," including placing it in a footnote. Hume comes off as unconsciously asserting that surely no intellectual could disagree with this. (See famous names above.) Then, along comes this pipsqueak Beattie ...

Hume's "Populousness" must be faulted in another way which further illustrates his rank hypocrisy.

Hume claims in it that modern (for him) Europe was superior to ancient Rome and Greece because they had chattel slavery and Europe did not. This of course ignores the British (and French) Caribbean sugar island slave plantations, which, as Harris reminded us, Hume knew about personally from trying to broker the sale of some of them! Or, from his time in London, seeing plantation owners sit in Parliament! The French and British economies were very dependent on this. Remember, Napoleon tried to reconquer Haiti, and he did reimpose slavery elsewhere in the French Caribbean. Before that, after the Seven Years War, France let Britain have Canada as long as it could keep all of its sugar islands.

Again, this is not just hypocrisy. This is RANK hypocrisy.

==

Update: Julian Baggini goes in the tank for Hume. Undercutting him?

And? Undercutting even more Sir Tom Devine, the present-day Scottish historian he cites, claiming there was no push for abolition in Scotland in 1762, the time of his sugar plantation intervention, which he claims is in a "purported" letter?

In history we teach our students not to indulge in the intellectual sin of anachronistic judgement, i.e. never to impose the values of today on those of the past. In 1762, the year of David Hume’s reported letter on the plantations, there is no evidence that any groups in Scotland opposed chattel slavery in the colonies. The surge of abolitionism and widespread horror at man’s inhumanity to his fellow man only came later. In that sense, Hume was a man of his time, no better and no worse than any other Scot at the time.

Scotland was part of the UK, and was so for Hume's entire live. In addition, by this time, Hume had lived in London, and on the continent. (Amazing how the "world" of Enlightenment letters & ideas can be so selective.) Abolition was a happening thing in England; James Oglethorpe founded Georgia to be slavery-free, and for humanitarian reasons, before the original version of Hume's footnote.

And, Beattie and his mentor Thomas Reid? SCOT! 

AND? He's arguably wrong about "no evidence that any groups ..." Per that "happening thing" link from Wiki (which has a footnote, so shut up):

Some of the first freedom suits, court cases in Britain to challenge the legality of slavery, took place in Scotland in 1755 and 1769. The cases were Montgomery v. Sheddan (1755) and Spens v. Dalrymple (1769). Each of the slaves had been baptised in Scotland and challenged the legality of slavery. They set the precedent of legal procedure in British courts that would later lead to success for the plaintiffs. In these cases, deaths of the plaintiff and defendant, respectively, brought an end to the action before a court decision could be rendered.[8]

Also, per the same link, John Wesley, who created this organized group called "Methodism," started writing against slavery on moral grounds two years before Hume died.

I am tired of this. I've already told Baggini on Twitter that I'm going to do a new post. Basically, I see things like this as a version of Platonic noble lies, based on ideas that cancel culture or whatever is so evil all tools in opposition to it are fair game.

As for the British involved with the tower's de-naming not calling out China more? Two wrongs don't make a right.

===

Update, March 3, 2022: Via Massimo, Baggini continues this by, to put it politely, offering an overly charitable interpretation of Hume's socio-political bigotry.

In light of that, I should note that this time, Baggini has responded when poked with the Twitter stick.

And, yes, he may in this piece call Hume a "thorough" racist, but, given that in the Medium piece above, he also claims that this was "casual" racism and essentially a "one off,) and and that it's "presentism" to judge him by today's standards (and wrongly makes those claims, as shown)? 

"What the right hand giveth, the left taketh away."  

Or, to go Shakespearean in another way?

"Methinks you doth undercut yourself too much."

Seriously, how can one be a "thorough" racist and yet a "casual" or "one-off" racist???

Baggini claims:

And, I quoted back to him his own comment from Medium, and Devine's comments that he appears to quote favorably. It may be too harsh to say that he's giving Hume a pass. But, I didn't actually do that. In my first Tweet reply to Baggini and the podcast touting him, I said:

And, there you go. And, nothing in the last 24 hours since this conversation has started has made me change my mind. If I did say Baggini gives Hume "a total pass" anywhere, I apologize. Per informal logic and Bayesian probabilities, I do think he gives at least a 51 percent pass, and my believe in that has only increased.

Beyond that, re the "Populousness of Ancient Nations" discussion I note that Hume engages in deck-stacking on the issue of ancient vs modern slavery. There's nothing casual or one-off about that.

==

Finally, more and more, as I look again at his Prospect piece and other writing? I think Baggini, like Harris, like Dan Kaufman, and others, gets Hume of the Treatise vs. Hume of the post-Treatise, or the Pyrrhonic Skeptic Hume vs. the Academic Skeptic Hume, wrong, by not noting there is indeed a difference.

==

And, per a discussion on MeWe, sorry, but this DOES, if not detract from Hume's (or Kant's, Locke's or Voltaire's) work in general, at a minimum, it brings it under heightened scrutiny. I'm sorry that it doesn't for you.

==

More here on Hume's racism, which also notes that Hume believed in polygenesis.

Thursday, January 14, 2021

James Harris awakened me from my Humean dogmatic slumber

 I'm sure that he had no idea he was doing this, though we've had a brief exchange of emails, focused on Hume's racism and related issues.

But, he did.

What follows below is an edited and expanded version of my Goodreads review of his 2015 biography of Hume.

A week from now, I plan to post an edited version of my review of E.C. Mossner's old 1954 bio, including some points of comparison (and definite contrast) with Harris.

This is the second in a series, one that started with last week's post about presentism, as that piece was focused on Hume (as a stand-in for Enlightenment philosophers in general) and racism.

After the Mossner biography post, I plan to post every other week about some specific aspects of Hume as brought to new focus, and awakened from uncritical dogmatic slumber about Hume, by Harris and Harris prodding me into looking at some of Hume's lesser works, or anew at some of his major ones, and his major ideas.

With that, let's dig in!

Hume: An Intellectual BiographyHume: An Intellectual Biography by James A. Harris
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

This was a tough, tough book to review. I took a lot of notes. Early on, my appetite whetted by the Introduction, I would have been very ready to five-star it. The framing of Hume as a man of letters, or to go French along with the mot of him as "le bon David," as a "litterateur," seemed a promising new focus. And yet?

Direct vs indirect passions is an interesting matter, one that was but touched on by Harris. It probably could have been studied even more, and by Hume as a philosopher as well as Harris analyzing him as a philosopher. (One of the upcoming posts in the series will be about "young Hume" vs "old Hume," whether or not there were two different Humes, and if so, how much "the passions" was part of that split.

Harris rejects the claim that Hume was a "divided" philosopher. So does the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Other commenters on this book accept that, and accept Hume's own claim he rejected the Treatise because it was "the manner, not the matter" of how it read, rather than what it said. Rather, this is to accept Hume's public self-preservation at face value. Especially on the issue of the passions, Hume DID reject "the matter" of the Treatise and never did accept it — or return to it — again. (Mossner disagrees, and I think he has "the goods" to at least partially support this.)

Then, the biggie. I knew what to look for, as far as how Harris handled it.

By the time I got to Harris' mishandling (that's the best I can call it) about Hume's infamous footnote about "the Negros" in "Of National Characteristics," it lost a star right there, and was slipping a bit before then. Sadly, at the time of this review on Goodreads, no other reviewer had noted this there.

Hume was challenged on his racist views in his own time, above all by the Scottish philosopher James Beattie. Harris treats both the footnote and Hume's editing of it, and why, in only a footnote. He then claims that it was NOT in response to Beattie, though the evidence is pretty clearly against him. Worse, in an email, he said he couldn't remember what he wrote. This area will be covered much more in the specific post.

Also, the sharpness of Hume's reaction to Beattie undercuts le bon David, which is part of Harris' whole focus.

How it handled his "Essays Moral and Political" in general shoved it into three-star territory. That said, Harris later admitted to me that he agreed many of the essays are "shallow" [and they are], along with other things. I'll be offering a few thoughts on "Of National Characteristics" as part of a piece on Hume and race and going beyond my "presentism" piece.

Then, his handling of Hume the historian moved it back into four-star range.

But, next, while this is an intellectual biography, it could have been more personal on the Hume-Rousseau situation. Finally, tying back to "that footnote," Hume's reaction to James Beattie — and Harris' take on that — undercut "le bon David" of legend.

Harris claims Mossner, in his bio of Hume, is too hagiographic. 

And, that leads me to the New York Review of Books, take, which said: "Mossner’s life of Hume is suffused with an affection for its subject that, according to Harris, sometimes obstructs a 'properly dispassionate' examination of the facts.” This is the petard-hoisting area. Again, I think Harris is guilty of some of this himself.

I'll touch on some of this when I do my comparison-contrast of Mossner's bio with Harris'.

Next, whether it's Hume himself stressing the claim, or Harris burnishing it? On "The Natural History of Religion," polytheistic gods weren't, and aren't, always kind and cuddly, and monotheistic ones aren't always harsh father figures. Contra the former, see Shiva, or even more, Kali. Contra the latter, see the deified versions of the Buddha in many "denominations" within Mahayana.

The book was generally good on Hume's skill as a historian. And, I agree that Elizabeth was an absolute monarch and that the Stuarts got bad press. Nonetheless, in his later revisions to his volumes of history, Hume comes off as a "trimmer." If that's part of how one gets to be "le bon David," pass.

View all my reviews

Thursday, January 07, 2021

Thoughts against presentism (and an intro to critical study of Hume)

In my calling David Hume a racist or Aristotle sexist, professional philosophers such as Massimo Pigliucci have accused me of "presentism." (That said, I think Massimo seems to be softening, at least on Hume.)

I reject the charge because I reject the concept.

Briefly, here's why.

As I see it, "presentism" is an absolute adjective.

All I have to do is find one non-sexist in Aristotle's Greece, or one non-racist in Hume's Great Britain, and the idea is undermined.

And, while I may not think of particular Britons, some of the French philosophes were certainly anti-racist. And, I point to Aristophanes' "Lysistrata" as anti-sexist.

And, a quick Google let's me go straight to a contemporary of Hume's, per this piece:

Hume was challenged on his racist views in his own time, including by the Scottish philosopher James Beattie, who wrote: "The empires of Peru and Mexico could not have been governed, nor the metropolis of the latter built after so singular a manner, in the middle of a lake, without men eminent both for action and speculation.

"Boom," in a word. (That said, Beattie only challenges his anti-Indian racism directly. Of course, White Europeans knew little about Timbuktu and even less about the Great Zimbabwe at that time.) THAT said, per this philosophical essay, Hume revised his original racism agasint Blacks and American Indians to just an anti-Black racism in specific response to Beattie.

THAT said, the IEP, in its article on Beattie, reports that his magnum opus, "An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth," made Hume mad in general. Wiki, in its piece on the essay, notes Beattie had a habit of slash-and-burn attacks on opponents. And, a note: The essay, in German, was part of what "awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber."

Read the whole IEP article. Beattie offers a good refutation of racism in general.

Of course, Hume wasn't alone among Enlightenment philosophers, and said philosophers, while writing about morals, did little for practical moral advancement in their societies.

A second way of refuting Massimo, Dan Kaufman, Julian Baggini (added, see below) et al would be to hoist Hume by his own petard.

If nobody at the time of Aristotle were anti-sexist, and nobody at the time of Hume were anti-racist, than to use Hume's own phrasing, anti-racism or anti-sexism must have arisen "viz a miracle."

On anti-racism, the third way of refuting Massimo and Dan is to refer to any number of recent insightful books of social history which show the rise of "race" as a social construct in early Enlightenment Europe. 

So, I have three refutations of presentism in the charge of racism against Hume. (And, against Locke, Kant, Voltaire and others of this era.) I have two refutations of presentism in the charge of sexism against Aristotle.

And, bonus? One is directly philosophy-connected, via linguistic philosophy. (Sidebar: I wonder how much the issue of what is an absolute adjective and what is not has been studied in modern linguistics and philosophy of language.)

QED.

Update, Feb. 12: Baggini, per a new post in my series about Hume that I'm adding in response to him, wants to make "presentism" a non-absolute descriptor. I reject that, for the reasons above. Even if I accepted that the idea of presentism, empirically, should be defined in majoritarian terms, per the logical side, specifically, psychological logic, I would reject his claim that the minority side in 1700s Scotland was so small that we can essentially ignore it. This statement applies not just to him, and not just to the issue of presentism vis-a-vis Hume and racism.

Update, Feb. 18: Per a discussion of that Baggini post at MeWe, bringing up vegetarianism to defend charges of presentism while talking about slavery in general, rather than race-based slavery, as "race" is basically a human construct and "race" as understood in the modern West is an Enlightenment-times European intellectual construct, is a way to lose your argument from the start in my book.

As for the the analogy in general? I don't think it flies, for various reasons. One, science can never give us a straight, set-in-stone answer on what animals are sentient or not, if "sentience" is part of what drives vegetarianism. It's a philosophical demarcation problem, but one that philosophers won't agree on. Ditto on what animals suffer pain or not.

That said, vegans score vegetarians for inflicting pain on animals through milking, egg-stealing, etc.

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Schedule of related blogging (now updated and expanded):

  1. A more in-depth look at Harris' bio of Hume than my Goodreads review, Jan. 14;
  2. A more in-depth look at Mossner's bio of Hume than my Goodreads review, Jan. 21;
  3. Hume, racism and general bigotry, and ultimate rank hypocrisy, Feb. 4;
  4. Julian Baggini goes in the tank to defend Hume, Feb. 18
  5. Le bon David: David Hume as litterateur, March 4;
  6. Is David Hume just a bundle in my mind? Or just a petard hoisting? March 18;
  7. Young Hume vs Old Hume: The passions and more,  March 25;
  8. And, an add-on, on the issue of Hume, race and slavery: Exposing what seems to be willing lying on his part in "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations," June 12.

The addition of the Baggini piece is the key change from the original number of posts, and in turn affects the full schedule. Given that I've been on an alternate-weeks schedule, the last post may move to April 1. 

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More here on Hume's racism, which also notes that Hume believed in polygenesis.