Missing: A fourth philosopher on grief

Big Think has a pretty good short piece on three philosophers as standard-bearers for approaches to grief.

After an initial hat tip to memento mori, it looks at each of the three: Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Camus. 

It's not bad as far as it goes, but it doesn't go far enough.

It needs a philosopher of pessimism, say Schopenhauer from the 19th century or Cioran from the 20th. Or maybe, if you strip off the religious veneer, an Unamuno. 

This is an issue where I part with Camus. "The Myth of Sisyphus," and above all its central message that "we must imagine Sisyphus happy," cited in the piece just before linking to the end of "Life of Brian" about looking on the bright side of life, has always struck me as a wrong move.

Let us quote the whole ending, in translation:

I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy."

OK, let's unpack.

I have no "necessity" (as in psychological, not logical) to imagine Sisyphus, or myself in similar circumstances, as happy. That might be a way of mocking god or the gods, but I'm pretty sure Camus is a good secularist, so, to me, not only should it be true that "You don't tug on Superman's cape," but "you don't spit into the wind [of fate]" and then laugh, or smile.

What in detail does that mean, beyond my riff on Croce, though? (Jim, not Benedetto!) 

First, was Camus as a womanizer in part talking about "the thrill of the chase," per an old Deep Purple song? If so, I think he was wrong on that, too, and I think it's a variation or subset of the above.

There's also a false dichotomy. I can see the universe as not sterile, and not futile, but at the same time, per Genesis 1, תֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ or tohu wәvohu in English transliteration — formless and void. Rejecting futility doesn't mean embracing happiness. Also, per Camus' words, he could be seen here, or accused here, of riffing on Nietzsche and postulating Sisyphus as beyond good and evil.

Next, what is the "higher fidelity"? Camus doesn't totally get into this.

The big issue is that we must look critically at Camus' framing. I've hinted at this with the Nietzsche comment, but we need to go further.

In the original myth, Sisyphus was an automaton. He was condemned to push this rock.

So, to riff on Camus, "We must first imagine Sisyphus with volition." An automaton can't really have emotion.

Or do we have to imagine that? For Camus, we do, I think, but do we have to for other interpretations? Can Sisyphus still have a consciousness, even if Zeus in some way controls all his motor neurons?

Anyway, I think Big Think gets it wrong. Sisyphus is certainly not fighting grief, or even generalized loss.

And, I think absurdist Camus is the wrong incarnation of Camus to be riffing on Sisyphus.

Rather, even if he can't physically revolt, Sisyphus imagining himself happy is man in revolt.

I was thinking of a long-ago read that I called "the best three-star book I've ever read," and that might still be true.

Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit by Joshua Foa Dienstag
My rating: 3 of 5 stars

A so-so to decent book that could have been so much better

Occasionally I'll penalize a book for having a good, even a great, concept and just not doing it full justice, and this is one of those occasions.

This book rates at least five stars for its rehabilitation of pessimism and for its excellence at connecting the dots between different philosophers without an established "school of pessimism."

It ranks less than five stars for not fulfilling its potential and overlooking three major areas.

Dienstag's project of rehabilitation for philosophical pessimism is done well. He begins by stating two core tenets of philosophical pessimism, that it is anti-systemic and anti-optimistic. He also, in his preface, indicates he will most focus on where pessimism plays out in the arena of political philosophy.

From this, he tackles specific philosophers who can be seen as having a pessimistic core, and groups them into cultural, metaphysical and existential pessimists

First, he shows that many philosophers in each of these three categories did not take pessimism to a world-denying, resigned conclusion. Here he contrasts the culturally engaged Leopardi to the withdrawing Rousseau, the metaphysically engaged Freud to the withdrawing Schopenhauer and the existentially engaged Camus to the withdrawn Cioran.

Dienstag then devoted a separate chapter to Nietzsche, followed by a second devoted to the central role of aphorism as a writing style within philosophical pessimism. He finishes with offering up some of his own aphoristic observations, which make several good points.

I found his outline of pessimism to be hugely thought-provoking. I would find myself connecting the dots on one particular line of thought, turn the page, and see him doing similar dot-connecting in print.

...

Now, the book's shortcomings:

The first is early philosophers. It's bad enough that Dienstag just gives a passing glance to the pre-Socratics, especially since he talks about Nietzsche's analysis of them. It's worse by far that he overlooks post-Socratic Cynicism. 

Other than it possibly (though Diogenes himself has little to say on the matter) still having a cyclical, not linear view of history, Cynicism meets all the benchmarks Dienstag establishes to define philosophical pessimism. Skepticism, beyond his brief mention of Pyrrhonic Skepticism, also deserves more mention and coverage.

The second big oversight was not to include 20th century discoveries in the natural science. Quantum theory, if not antioptimistic, at least puts definite limits on human knowledge. So does general relativity. And so, they push back against his claim that scientific positivism is used up.

The third oversight comes directly from philosophy. How Dienstag could not even have a word of mention for Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, which is, at base, a wrecker of systems, totally escapes me.

Dienstag could have added to his three classes of political, metaphysical and existential pessimism a fourth field of logical pessimism. And he could have considered Wittgenstein here in addition to Gödel.

Now, it's true that Dienstag, in his preface, limits his focus to "pessimism (as) a philosophical sensibility from which political practice can be derived." That would rule out Gödel and Wittgenstein, to be sure, but not the Cynics.

Couple of other nitpicking points.

Here and in interviews, Dienstag calls cynicism (lowercase) a negative philosophy. First, cynicism as lowercased is a psychology, not a philosophy. Greek Cynicism is by no means a negative philosophy. For that matter, the same applies to skepticism the attitudinal state vs. Skepticism the philosophical school.

For someone new to the field of philosophy, let alone political philosophy, this book might be five-star worthy. But, to me, Dienstag falls short of that mark. And, the last observations were just about enough to three-star it for me.

I finally did so in the end precisely because this book could have been so much more.

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Or, beyond this book, the Big Think authors (and Camus) needed to read some Edward Arlington Robinson.  

Also, I just read Wikipedia's article about Camus' play "Caligula." Really? Trying to make Caligula himself, even if we discount the worst of the slurs against him, into Sisyphus 2.0? Ye gads.

Plato vs Diogenes: Dueling biographies

 At the Atlantic, Kieran Setiya reviews what is billed as the first full-length bio of Plato, and a new English translation of a relatively recent bio of Diogenes.

I agree at least in part, though not necessarily fully, with the main points on both philosophers.

Plato:

Dull;

Mixed and muddied Socratic ethical thrusts with metaphysics;

The ancient version of an academic theoretician.

Diogenes:

Man of ethical action and truer heir of Socrates;

Unlucky in philosophical history;

Allegedly learned about reinterpreting Delphi.

Note that I said I don't fully agree with either.

Aristophanes said Socrates was a Sophist; I agree, contra protestations of many philosophers, including friend Massimo Pigliucci. Setiya doesn't mention this. It's why Plato surely redefined Sophism in some ways. And, one doesn't need to learn Greek, unlike Izzy Stone, to see not just problems with Plato's portrayal of Socrates, but what was likely genuine to semi-genuine in that portrayal. Above all, re the "Wisest man in Athens" BS, Socrates was not what Plato cracked him up to be, and on this, I think Socrates was cracking himself up to be this, too. And, I remained unconvinced that Socrates was metaphysics-free. In fact, I think he had musings on the metaphysics of his ethical rhetorical questions that led Plato to his Forms.

Diogenes? The idea that Delphi told him to "debase the currency" and that he later realized that was meant to be metaphorical has struck as being more likely to be urban legend than truth. Setiya ignores that Diogenes was assisting his dad in this. It's a nice philosophical cover story, but probably no more than that.

Otherwise? Yes, sadly, Zeno of Kitium muddled Diogenes' ethical imperatives to live away from culture with Stoic metaphysics, even though he was a second-generation disciple. Setiya misses the issue that under Alexander's Diadochoi, then the Roman imperium, that this had to be trimmed to the sails.

Both books could be good in their own right. Or not so good. The end of Setiya's piece indicates that Plato biographer Waterfield appears to cut semi-blank checks, at least, to the fascism of The Republic.

Is the world ready for some neo-Cynicism?

Update, March 13, 2015: The original essay, at the link, was one of the semifinalists in 3 Quarks Daily's politics and social science writing contest. Might sound strange to some to enter a philosophy essay into contest in those categories, but if you'll read on, maybe you won't think that way by the end.

By using the capital-C word, I'm indicating the ancient philosophy, not the psychological attitude.

Is the world ready? More important, is the world needing this? My answer here, at Massimo Pigliucci's new philosophy webzine.

That answer is a "yes," with details of how I think we should update Cynicism for today. Click the link for more.

For people unfamiliar with the basics of the philosophy, beyond perhaps knowing that Diogenes masturbated in public and told Alexander the Great to get out of his light, the Wikipedia entry has a good summary of base points:

1. The goal of life is Eudaimonia and mental clarity or lucidity (ἁτυφια) – freedom from τύφος (smoke) which signified ignorance, mindlessness, folly, and conceit.

2. Eudaimonia is achieved by living in accord with Nature as understood by human reason.

3. τύφος (Arrogance) is caused by false judgments of value, which cause negative emotions, unnatural desires, and a vicious character.

4. Eudaimonia or human flourishing, depends on self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια), equanimity, arete, love of humanity, parrhesia and indifference to the vicissitudes of life (ἁδιαφορία).

5. One progresses towards flourishing and clarity through ascetic practices (ἄσκησις) which help one become free from influences – such as wealth, fame, or power – that have no value in Nature. Examples include Diogenes’ practice of living in a tub and walking barefoot in winter.

6. A Cynic practices shamelessness or impudence (Αναιδεια) and defaces the Nomos of society; the laws, customs, and social conventions which people take for granted.

The “flourishing” is of course a commonality with most other ancient Greek philosophies. Point 2 gets back to Massimo’s Stoicism essay on showing some commonality, and is my point of departure, with a different assessment of human nature, for neo-Cynicism.

Points 3-6 then spell out how to achieve this … and why — that the challenging of convention, asceticism and related practices are designed to produce mental and emotional clarity.

In my comments on the piece in response to others (at least to others who get the difference between the philosophy and the small-c psychology), I responded to one person who asked about what a neo-Cynicism might be for, and not just against, my one-word answer?

Authenticity. 

My version of neo-Cynicism should be seen, in part, as being a more pessmistic outgrowth of humanistic psychologies of the 1950s and 1960s.

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And, for the second time, one of my essays for Massimo has been picked up by 3 Quarks Daily.

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In essays in the future on this blog, some of them will focus on developing the project of Neo-Cynicism in my personal life.

Book review: 'Cynics'

Cynics by William Desmond

My rating: 5 of 5 stars


This is a very good introduction to Capital-C Cynicism the philosophy, which is much different in many ways from cynicism the social behavior, though Cynics did at times act in a way that we might today call specifically cynical.

In the first semester of my college Philosophy 101 course, Cynics (and Skeptics) got short shrift among ancient Greek philosophies, not only compared to Socrates/Plato/Aristotle, but also compared to the Stoics, the Presocratics and to a degree, even the Epicureans.

Which is too bad, and was partially founded on wrong ideas.

First, the Cynics aren't sprung from the font of Socrates; the movement arguably has Presocratic roots, as Desmond shows. And, since Zeno the founder of Stoicism studied from a Cynic before going off on his own, Desmond notes the parallels between the two, and the likely direction of influence, an influence that continued as late as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius both shows tints of Cynic stances.

Second, Desmond shows that Cynics were acting the way they were in what might be called an activist Westernized version of Zen. At their best, Cynics were encouraging a kind of activist detachment from conventional thoughts and mores, and even from all but the barest of physical needs.

That said, while some of their antics, like Diogenes telling Alexander to get out of his light, sound courages and enlightened, others, like Diogenes' masturbating in public, were as repulsive to his fellow Greeks as they are to readers today. But that was the intent.

Finally, Desmond addresses the "new search for the historical Jesus" types like John Dominic Crossan, who claim Jesus was the Jewish equivalent of a Cynic sage, and finds them largely wanting. It is true that Gadara of Legionary demoniac fame was an old center of Cynic thought, but the parallels between Jesus and a Iamblichus or similar are few and tendentious.

You'll learn all that and much more in this easy-to-read introduction to a sadly neglected and misunderstood school of philosophical thought.



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The reason one or two particular versions of early Christianity has some appeal to me

But not enough realism, for the most part, to be usable

Whether or not there even was a Jesus of history, one of the earliest Christianities, and the first to impute words to a historical Jesus, was the Cynic-shaped “Galilean Christianity.”

Combining the maxims and convention-rejecting emphasis of Cynicism with the prophetic preaching of late-Israelite proto-Judaism was a potent mix. For a person wanting a foundation for personal and spiritual growth that transcended the materialism of its day just as much as ours, why wouldn’t a quasi-idealist like me be attracted?

And, speaking of idealism …

The middle Platonism of the early Christian philosophers has some appeal. Defining a heaven or afterlife as a progression into a Platonic ideal self and locale, without the mysticism or worse of later Neoplatonism has some appeal, especially if one does so with a non-Greek emphasis on a physical, yet somehow Paulist spiritual, body, and rejects the existence of an immaterial soul.

Of course, that’s not a key tenet of Platonism.

As for the other aspects of Christianity in its development, the jealous tribal God Yahweh of the Torah and Former Prophets has zero appeal. Neither does the dripping vengeance of Iranian apocalyptic dualism, wedded and welded to Judaism beginning with Daniel. Certainly the religious mysticism and the philosophical mumbo-jumbo of Paul’s adaptation of eastern Mediterranean mystery religions doesn’t, either.

Alas, though, there’s no indication of a divinity of any sort, let alone one powerful enough to recreate physical bodies into some Platonic ideal.

As for Cynic maxims and Israelite outcries, well I can, and hope I continue to, get better and living that from a secular background.