Two main things jumped out at me. One is his claim that Gilbert Ryle wasn't the only major philosophical influence on Dennett.
He says we should also look at Wilfrid Sellars:
As the contemporary Oxford philosopher Anil Gomes observed in the London Review of Books in 2023, the key to understanding Dennett lies with another 20th-century American philosopher, Wilfrid Sellars – something of a philosopher’s philosopher. Sellars distinguished between two images of reality, the manifest image and the scientific image. The manifest image is the ordinary, everyday conception of reality – the conception of reality that human beings have prior to science. The scientific image, of course, is the conception of reality delivered by science.
Everybody knows a big part of Dennett's schtick was folk psychology, and Bayne says this was Dennett's version of the manifest image.
The biggie is — where is Dennett at in trying to incorporate some ideas from folk psychology into real psychology as a philosophy of mind? And, Bayne eventually looks at Dennett's idea of the self as a center of narrative gravity. He says this, essentially, stays in the manifest image and not the scientific image, and is based on stories. From this, he goes back to Wittgenstein as ordinary language philosopher. Here's his take on storytelling in general.
Indeed, if Dennett’s analysis of the self was driven by anything, it was driven not by science but by stories – and by stories about stories. At the heart of his paper ‘The Self as a Centre of Narrative Gravity’ (1992) is a story about a story-writing machine
From this, he says Dennett's idea is that, based on Ryle, "we" aren't looking for a causal explanation of behavior but rather sense-making. And, that's where Bayne discusses "the intentional stance."
That said, Bayne says Dennett himself was retreating from his view of intentionality by the end of his life.
Beyond that, aren't "we" as professional and amateur philosophers looking for a causal explanation of mind, beyond but including behavior?
Here qualia pop up.
The Philosophers’ Lexicon – first published by Dennett a decade before ‘Quining Qualia’– defines ‘to quine’ as to deny ‘resolutely the existence or importance of something real or significant’. Dennett coined the term in homage to his undergraduate advisor W V O Quine, who had tried to construct a metaphysics with as few entities as possible. That’s ‘quining’; what about ‘qualia’? Dennett distinguished two senses of this term. In one sense, qualia (singular: quale) are simply the ways that things seem to us in perceptual experience. (To use Dennett’s example, consider how a glass of milk looks at sunset – that’s a quale.) To deny that there are ways the world appears to us in perceptual experience would indeed be in the running for ‘the silliest claim ever made’, but Dennett made no such claim. Instead, his eliminativism was directed towards a certain conception of perceptual experience – Qualia-with-a-capital-Q. To believe in Qualia is to think that the experiential character of consciousness (‘the ways things seem to us’) involves properties that are intrinsic, private, ineffable and directly available to introspection. It is Qualia – and not qualia – that Dennett quined.
As I told Massimo Pigliucci, assuming Bayne has a good interpretation of Dennett's thought, then Dennett comes off as essentially creating a fictive (sic) Platonic idea of Qualia capital Q, and then using that as a strawman to beat down opponents of his thoughts.
Dennett was good at other strawmanning, which leads me to endorse that Bayne IS at least in the right neighborhood. Further confirmation comes further down:
Note, in passing, the absence of science here. There is no mention of single-cell recordings; no appeal to computational models of brain activity; no measures of entropy. Instead, we’re asked to consider a purely fictional scenario. Dennett’s case against Qualia rests on a purely philosophical argument that would not have been out of place in the 1950s. (Indeed – as Dennett himself points out – it is a variation on a purely philosophical argument that was given in the 1950s: Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘beetle in the box’ argument.) Although there is background concern here with scientific methods – in effect, Dennett is challenging the Qualia-phile to explain how Qualia might be studied – nothing in the way of ‘brain learning’ is assumed.
Dennett’s rejection of Qualia wasn’t a rejection of consciousness – it was a rejection of a certain conception of consciousness. But if Dennett didn’t reject consciousness, what explanation did he provide of it?
None, of course. Hence wags noting that the proper title for a mid-1990s book of his was "Dan Dennett's Ideas of Consciousness Explained."
There you are. That's our Danny boy!
And hence, while I noted his passing, and followed up on that, I wasn't philosophically crushed. Per that first link, I agreed with John Horgan that Dennett's rejection of at least capital-Q Qualia was a back door to Chalmers' p-zombies. Horgan's piece has a section on this. Second, I also agreed with John that Dennett was a practitioner of scientism, namely in his philosophy. His lack of actual science in his ideas on consciousness is one example. His claiming that evolution was algorithmic and a universal acid beyond biology is another.
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