Can you get an "ought" from an "is"?

The traditional answer ever since the middle of the 1700s, per David Hume on the is ≠ ought problem, is a semi-clear to clear no.

But, Massimo Pigliucci says otherwise, using Philippa Foot's original claim as justification.

I remain unconvinced, and told Massimo so, including telling him that I thought she was practicing "discourse ethics."

At a minimum, the claim that it's "super easy, barely an inconvenience," as Philosophy Now says, is laughable.

Several things to unpack.

Per the top link, Hume himself, didn't always dodge this bullet. But, I would argue that, first, this might be a case of Emerson's foolish consistency. I would also argue, as the link notes, that Moore and others took similar stances.

Foot is a moral realist as part of being a virtue ethicist. I'm not a moral anti-realist, but I'm not planted in the moral realism camp. I'm really some kind of moral skeptic, but one who rejects moral error theory. I'm probably more a non-cognitivist, then a Pyrrhonic moral skeptic second. I think Hume, today, with his famous statement on the passions, might see himself as a non-cognitivist, calling moral statements emotional ones in many cases.

Or, like Massimo himself, as I blogged about a year ago (that's maybe a sound of a petard you hear, Massimo), I'm a moral naturalist, who, if you want to use other labels, is a moral non-realist, or a person who "mu's" moral realism. But, it's not totally the sound of a petard hoisting, not there.

And, I'm an eclecticist on schools of moral thought; I have some ideas that square more with utilitarianism, while not being fully planted there, either.

I think the criticisms of moral realism in the last paragraph of that Wiki link are cogent. Other than a few clear moral stances such as "do not murder," why are there multiple, not just two, but three, five or seven, different stances on many moral issues if moral facts exist? And, since Foot herself invented the trolley problem, and people's thoughts on this run a broad spectrum, and there's a different broad spectrum when one actually has them do this in a virtual reality machine, we're at least halfway into petard-hoisting right now.

Massimo seems to try to avoid the petard when he says he's a moral non-realist but not anti-realist. He then calls himself a moral naturalist.

The evolution of ethics along with human psychology is also of note. Plus, moral realism doesn't seem to leave room for cultural evolution. In fact, if we substitute "Mother Nature" for Kant's god, it risks running into a deontology brick wall. And, here, I think that includes Massimo. And the petard. That said, humans' ability to evolve culturally is itself ultimately a naturalistic artifact, so Massimo may be back off the petard, especially as he stresses the importance of cultural evolution elsewhere. But ... I don't really think that's in his moral naturalism stance.

I think, if Hume were alive today, he'd look at the behavioral economics of Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Dan Ariely, et al, and build on his empirical background to articulate a parallel theory of "behavioral ethics." Just as they challenged the idea that we are rational economic actors, I think he'd use similar modern behavioral studies to challenge the idea that we are rational moral actors, which virtue ethicisists essentially claim we are.

He, good philosopher that he was in many ways, wouldn't confine that within psychology, though.