Early Christian book destruction: Are we missing something?

 Historical theology scholars and other students of Christian origins know that "The True Word," the polemic of Celsus against early Christianity, was later likely destroyed (after imperial ban) and we know it only in fragments quoted by Origen in "Contra Celsus." (It's interesting to note that already, pre-200, Celsus was afraid of the growth of Christianity. Is that tacit support for the "soft mythicist" idea that Jesus was actually one of the Pharisees crucified by Alexander Jannaeus a century before the gospel dating of his life?

Likewise, Philostratus' gospel of Apollonius of Tyana was based on one or more earlier sources — one that also, indirectly, refutes mythicists by showing how early legendary accretions can develop. It's unknown if these earlier sources were simply lost, or destroyed. It's also unknown why no emperor issued a ban against it. Surely, in the fourth and fifth centuries, it wasn't already that unknown.

What about a possible third set of gospels which have never even been hinted at existing?

Mandaeism is an almost-dead world religion allegedly based on John the Baptizer having a position broadly analogous to Jesus in Christianity. The religion, beyond claiming John as its chief prophet (though not as a dying-rising savior god) is Gnosticizing, but not necessarily fully Gnostic. The first writings trace back to the third century CE, though some want to push them earlier. Given that Acts 18-19 has disclples of John wandering around western Asia Minor (in the very early second century CE by my dating of Acts), and the way John's baptism is made to look "less than" that of Jesus (who only gives a mandate to baptize in Matthew), they must have been seen as some sort of competition. So, were some of their writings destroyed as well? Or just lost within the empire as the religion settled (precariously, at times) in Parthian and Sassanid controlled Mesopotamia?

On a genealogy of morals, so to speak

A recent blog post by Massimo Pigliucci, which contained within it a Philosophical Salon piece about the dichotomy between Hobbes thinking humans essentially (in the philosophical sense!) evil vs. Rousseau thinking them essentially good, got me to thinking, especially when Massimo also had psted a Pysche piece about Wilfrid Sellars and "the myth of the given."

First, contra Hobbes, if we truly were “evil” we’d never have developed the level of cooperation to create civilizations in the first place! I’m not sure if Hobbes ever even entertained that idea, but I think it pretty well kneecaps him.

That said, I was further inspired, per the title of this piece, to riff on Nietzsche and thing of a “genealogy of morals,” or rather, whether such a thing can totally exist.

Can we make such a simplistic judgment, or one that looks to be a simplistic judgment, as well as a species-wide one, and also one that still has a whiff of the religious about it? I say no, and here’s why.

And, what I really mean on species-wide descriptors of “good” or “evil” is that …. Could that not be seen as a recursive moral form of self-reference, and thus subject to a equivalent of Gödel / Tarski issues? Good thought on a morals-focused Christian religious holiday, eh? (Massimo normally posts on Fridays, and this one fell on Good Friday.) In other words, since humans as a species, in part via and because of that cultural evolution, define what “good” and “evil” are, isn’t this a form of recursive moral self-reference?

And now, to go further.

Taking this a step further, are human definitions of morality, if self-recursive, a version of something kind of like a Euthyphro dilemma?

In other words, is something evil because a near-absolute version of humans decides it’s evil? Or does evil exist independent of human judgment?

The former version risks going beyond consequentialist theories of ethics into pure relativism. After all, torture was thought to be highly moral not too many centuries ago. And, in a further ethical quagmire, was usually supported in terms of “higher good.”

The second half of the dilemmic fork is somewhat different than in Plato’s original, at least the way I am setting things up. As a methodological naturalist, of course, I see no Platonic Ideas of “good” and “evil.” But, if moral value judgments are not part of cultural evolution, then what? Evolutionary psychology, which to date has proven itself to be sexist and other things? A better-developed version, under different title, of the evolutionary development of psychological and philosophical structures?

The reality is that, per a comment by Massimo, in we critters, biological and cultural evolution have intertwined, and both probably have some parallel to epigenetics as well. What that means is, contra Nietzsche, there IS NO “genealogy of morals,” in that sense, to be laid out. 

Speaking of, I have just received in the mail a copy of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's "Moral Skepticisms" and am looking forward to it. 

And, to go beyond moral skepticism to moral existentialism, to me, it is often better to say that, rather than either good or evil, humans simply "are."

"Here I stand: I can do no other"; real? More likely, some nonsense of Luther legend

Yes, Lutheran, skeptical Lutheran, critical religious scholar and general skeptic kiddos, we're at THAT DATE.

It's the 500th anniversary of Luther's defiance at the Diet of Worms, at the end of which he almost certainly did NOT say what is imputed to him, that is, "here I stand, I can do no other," but rather, just ended. More here. (I tackled the even bigger Luther legend, that he nailed 95 Theses to the door [or even to the side on a bulletin board] of the Wittenberg Castle Church, in this blog post.)

Update, March 22, 2024: American Lutheran fascist, or "Lutefash," Corey Mahler, on his Twitter bio, believes this Luther urban legend. (Oh, he's also blocked me there for calling him out on other bullshit.)

WHY the pietistic ending was added at first seemed to me to be a puzzler itself. Luther's actual ending, "to go against conscience is neither right nor safe," is plenty powerful.

But, I have a guess.

Some later Lutheran, familiar with Brother Martin's "sola fide," and the core theme of his book, "On the Bondage of the Will," may have thought his actual ending was too humanistic. That's also because Luther said elsewhere that "my conscience is captive to god," but ... didn't want Karlstadt, Muentzer, et al, claiming that THEIR conscience had insights his didn't.

This should also be a note to fundamentalist Lutherans who are biblical literalists and reject historical-critical methodology, and specifically in the development of traditions about Jesus and claims of what he said. This is exactly how they develop.

And, speaking of, if you're Lutheran and think his German Bible was the first? Far from it. Now, it DOES appear to be the first translation from the Greek and the Hebrew (how much Luther translated direct from the Hebrew rather than cribbing off the Septuagint, a la Jerome, "King James" and others is still debatable) of any German bible, of which at least 18 complete versions in German existed before Luther wrote. Also, Meister Eckhart wrote his theology in German, and Johannes Tauler preached and wrote in German. See here.

Back to what Luther did and didn't say. Sadly, not just one but two of the three new-ish Luther bios I've recently read reports the legend as truth. (They're the two European-authored ones, both with authors with Lutheran connections, interestingly, even though many Lutherans elsewhere have led the charge against Luther legend.)

In addition, one of the links above notes that Charles V could just as well have said "to go against conscience is neither right nor safe." Good pious Catholic, he felt he had no choice but to eventually act against Luther. BUT, after the Schmalkaldic War, he did NOT have Luther's grave desecrated. He also remained a good, dedicated Holy Roman Emperor wanting to keep the Empire unified without a degree of coercion that might crack it apart.

Since he surely knew nothing but schoolbook/court Latin, and in everyday languages, his knowledge of German trailed that of Flemish and Spanish, how much Luther's speech — and Luther's broader ideas — were translated for him is a big deal. Because, with translation would have come interpretation.

On the other hand, he brought the Inquisition to the Netherlands. On the third hand, those were family lands, not imperial lands in a confederation.

In short, Charles V knew his pragmatic imperial politics. Sadly, a descendant of his brother didn't, 97 years later, contributing to the start of the Thirty Years War.

NOTE: This is part of an ongoing series of posts on the 500th anniversary of the Lutheran Reformation, Lutheran portion of the 16th Century Reformation, or whatever we should call it. Click the Reformation tag below for more. For both Reformation and non-Reformation takes on issues in Lutheranism, click that tag.

Nones continue to rise; there IS no "god-shaped hole"

The rise of the "Nones" in America doesn't mean a decline in belief, per this from the Atlantic:

"(W)hat was once religious belief has now been channeled into political belief."

That said, there is no "god-shaped hole." That's Augustinian bullshit, to put it bluntly. There IS, rather, a "god-belief-shaped hole."

The "nones" may indeed, per the SJW division of liberals (who are NOT leftists) may act in ways the second link states. But, with people acting like there is one, that may happen.

On the right, as the Religious Right had made the church politics in a way that the Black church really had not (and, in some ways, was forced to), with tied with the rise of Trumpism. So, they're already prepared for that.

What Searle and his critics AND Turing and others all get wrong — part one

That wasn't the intent of a recent piece by John Horgan at SciAm. Rather, he ultimately pivoted to thinking about what it means to really learn quantum physics.

Nonetheless, he DID provoke the headline thoughts in me.

Expanded from three Tweets to him, here’s the stimulation and light bulbs I got. 

First, here's what both Turing AND Searle (AND many AI friendly philosophers IMO) miss. We and other conscious entities in general are EMOTERS, not just thinkers. No WAY emotions act in a way to be run as a Chinese room experiment.

To riff on our mutual friend Massimo Pigliucci, as consciousness is in part definable as embodied cognition, we need to emphasize the “embodied.” We need to remember that stimuli that lead to emotional reactions come from external sensory perceptions as well as internal cogitation.

Related to that, as I have repeatedly said, our emotional depth and nuance, as well as second- third- and fourth-level theories of mind, is what distinguish us from a cow chewing the cud.

To put it in terms of the Chinese room? The “system” may be answering questions, but it’s not structured to have consciousness because the system as a whole, not just the person inside, is passive. It’s a plant, not an animal. (More on this in a part two.)

Second, the Chinese room is not like Turing OR real-world meatspace. The parameters of a closed vs. open system and related issues are different, plus what the specific intentionality is. Per Daniel C. Dennett, when your intuition pumps are reaching beyond good analogous ideas, you’ll pump out some funky stuff.

In this case, the intuition pumps miss the question of “is it like a plant” or “is it like an animal”? Plants do interact with their environments and do respond to them. They’re not conscious in any animalian sense and I still reject claims that they are.

Third, as for Dennett? His big miss on what you raise is looking at this similar to a black/white on/off conscious/unconscious switch, rather than a "slider" with various degrees of conscious/unconscious between 0 and 100. For guy who talked about "multiple drafts" it’s a bad oversight. But not a shocking one.

There is no "true self" but most people still claim there is

 I've said that both directly and indirectly more than once on this site. So has philosopher friend Massimo Pigliucci in various ways.

Now Vice has an in-depth look at this illusion.

Several good takeaways.

First is that people believe their ethics and morals are at the core of a true self.

Second, riffing on behavioral psychology, when people are asked to think about potential changes to their moral selves, when they make good changes, they say it's getting more in touch with that true self. When they imagine making negative changes, it's a "dark side" or something that is not part of their true self. Shades of loss aversion or similar! And, it's not just WEIRD; Hindus and Buddhists from India and Tibet have the same stance.

Third, under blood is thicker than water, if we have wingnut relatives acting like wingnuts, many of us say that's "not their true selves." (I don't have a problem saying it is.)

Fourth, outside people we know, this flips, especially in America, with a punitive criminal justice system.

The story goes on to talk about things like psychological essentialism and moral certification. Give it a read.

Martin Luther and witchcraft

It's well known, and well accepted outside of certain pockets of fundamentalist Lutheranism in the US, that Martin Luther had some connection, even if indirect, to the rise of Hitler-era German anti-Semitism.

Less known? His part in promulgating deepening belief in the reality of witchcraft in Germany, where the Empire became the greatest site in Europe (Scotland a close second) in witchcraft executions in the century or so after his death.

That Aeon story notes Luther's belief in the "drache," derived from the Greek and Latin "draco," but NOT the dragon of Revelation. Rather, in German and German-influenced lands to the east and northeast, it was a sort of household spirit. A "familiar," to use a witchcraft term, which Aeon surprisingly was not.

This, of course, was a Luther who believed in an active devil, once infamously throwing an inkwell at Satan. (That's actually a legend, but that's not the point; what is, is that it's a good illustrative point.)

Aeon's piece looks at the economic incentive to make accusations of witchcraft.  (And is not alone. More below.)

But, it ignores some others.

The century after Luther of course culminated with the Thirty Years War.

And, the Counter-Reformation, given first real legs by the Council of Trent, picked up steam in the 20 or so years before 1618, and arguably was one indirect cause of the Thirty Years War.

Witchcraft charges were usually at women, yes. But, in some cases, the women might have powerful husbands, sons or fathers. It was also a useful political weapon. As Aeon notes, an epicenter of witchcraft charges was in Bavaria. Note the map at right. Few people, though, know the Reformation, esp. its Lutheran branch, had a strong foothold there for a few decades, until determined Counter-Reformation activity spilled over from Hapsburg Austrian lands.

The economic dislocations of the war then intensified all aspects of Counter-Reformation, including witchcraft charges.

That third link, the "not alone," notes in Quartz what Aeon does not, that the economic nature of the charges was an angle that was leveraged in the name of religious warfare. It adds one other element, that an increasingly unified designation of what constituted actions of witchcraft arose in Switzerland before it became independent of the Empire. It adds the second element that what we know as Germany led Europe in religious tussles from the time the Albigensians were snuffed out in France.

Defining "life": a scientific and philosophical demarcation problem

What does it mean to be "alive"? Viruses in general make biologists struggle with that definition, and COVID-19 has brought that issue back to life, especially with having relatively few genes even for a virus.

In one of his latest "Elk" columns for the New York Times, Carl Zimmer weighs in heavily on the issue, not just for science, but to some degree, for philosophy of science, or per Massimo Pigliucci, more specifically, for philosophy of biology.

I think that, per his piece, and what I've read elsewhere, probably a slight majority of biologists would accept viruses as "alive," period ... maybe 55 percent? Another 15 percent might still say "nope." And, the remaining 30 percent would say something like "alive but..."

That said, the piece is worth a read otherwise, especially for the last one-third, talking about viruses and viral DNA entering the animal biome, and namely the human biome. Zimmer first notes that viruses as well as bacteria in our gut are important to our microbiome.

But, that's small potatoes.

The biggie is how, over aeons, viral DNA has entered animal DNA. For example, mammalian females' placenta development is dependent in part on old viral DNA inside mammalian genes. In this and other cases, mammals long ago not only, for the most part, neutralized threats from viral DNA but managed to repurpose it.

Zimmer discusses this issue, and his new book, even more at Quanta, with an excerpt from it.

He cites Wittgenstein, and he's barking up the right tree if we mean linguistic philosophy in general as well as some specific Wittgensteinian ideas. The issue of "family resemblance," per Witty's comment about defining "games," is one important issue.

"Cancer" book author Siddhartha Mukherjee has a review of the book. He notes that Zimmer also discusses modern new studies on things like brain organoids, as well as viruses, in wrestling with the demarcation issue. Spores also make the discussion list. So do multicellular creatures, like snakes in deep estivation.