Is "free will," at least as "compatibilists" generally strive to
define (and save) it, a philosophical equivalent of "a god of the gaps"?
I say the answer is an arguable yes.
Philosophy professor Eddy Nahmias is the latest
to try to defend some neo-traditionalist, if you will, version of free will.
Of course, when you start with a straw man howler like this, it's easy for you to get called "a free willer of the gaps":
When (neuroscientist Patrick) Haggard concludes that we do not have free will “in the sense we
think,” he reveals how this conclusion depends on a particular
definition of free will. Scientists’ arguments that free will is an
illusion typically begin by assuming that free will, by definition,
requires an immaterial soul or non-physical mind, and they take
neuroscience to provide evidence that our minds are physical.
First,
not all neuroscientists make that assumption. And, philosophers like
the Daniel Wegner whom you linked at the start of the column definitely
don't link free will, or its absence, to dualism, or its lack.
Then, there's this:
Many
philosophers, including me, understand free will as a set of
capacities for imagining future courses of action, deliberating about
one’s reasons for choosing them, planning one’s actions in light of this
deliberation and controlling actions in the face of competing desires.
We act of our own free will to the extent that we have the opportunity
to exercise these capacities, without unreasonable external or internal
pressure. We are responsible for our actions roughly to the extent that
we possess these capacities and we have opportunities to exercise
them.These capacities for conscious deliberation, rational thinking and
self-control are not magical abilities.
Well, if
you're not going to wrestle with what consciousness is, let alone what
standing free will at the level of consciousness has in the absence of a
Cartesian theater, you may have a problem. Nahmias does eventually get
around to tacking
Benjamin Libet and the famous 200-millisecond gap, but only to wave it away:
First of all, it does not show that a decision has been made
before people are aware of having made it. It simply finds discernible
patterns of neural activity that precede decisions. If we assume that
conscious decisions have neural correlates, then we should expect to
find early signs of those correlates “ramping up” to the moment of
consciousness.
Ahh, this is a petard hoister. It's all in how you define "decisions"
as well as "free will," isn't it? Under the Dan Dennett multiple drafts
model, this is rather the subconscious impulse that "wins out" to the
level of consciousness.
Finally,
to riff on Samuel Johnson, Nahmias enters into the last refuge of a free-will philosophy scoundrel: He makes the "fatal"
is-ought error.
We need conscious deliberation to make a difference when it matters — when we have important decisions and plans to make.
Need? As in "ought to have"? Ooops.
Some other thoughts from Wikipedia on free will, including reference to Haggard,
here.
That said, I think it IS possible to talk about free will in some
way, but only in a way that includes subselves and subconscious
processes.
UPDATE, Nov. 26: Massimo Pigliucci actually
defends Nahmias, claiming he "provides a nuanced and intelligent brief discussion of the topic." Massimo is often thought-provoking and never dumb, but he's just off base on this one. (In the same post, he says that way too much is read into Libet. I'll split the difference and say that somewhat too much may be read into him, and that what Libet's experiments study are somewhat imprecise. But, to claim he's pretty much irrelevant to discussions of free will is a stretch, at the least.)
UPDATE, Nov. 27: Add
this excellent essay
to your reading. From a neuroscience perspective, it argues that brain
systems that evolved to detect actual (or apparent) "intentionality" are
a focal point for the rise of an illusion of "self." And, here's
the journal essay that influenced that blog essay.
This ties in with Dan Dennett's "heterophenomenology." We assume
"selves" in others because of this 'intentionality set" that appears to
be built into our brains. But, Dennett doesn't quite note this is a
two-way street. Per modern social psychologists, the "self," or what we
call a "self" for ourselves, is in part a construct based on our
interaction with others. That includes them seeing, and noting, seeming
"intentionality" in ourselves.
So, even if there isn't a unitary self, not only do we act "as
if" there is, we find it hard not to do so because of this outside
conditioning as well as our own brain's mindset.
Now, a Buddhist meditation adept, or a devotee of deep
self-hypnosis, might be able to transcend that to some degree. But (and
this is why I only half-jokingly say "the only good Buddhist is a dead
Buddhist") the person who recognizes, and more than just intellectually
understands, that "self" is to some degree an illusion is generally
unable to hold on to that idea. The Zen monk rejoins the rest of the
monastery; the hypnosis adept walks out the door and into the larger
world. And "conventional" ideas of self get reinforced again.