Still disagreeing with Massimo in some ways on determinism

 He talks about this issue more in this piece, part 1 of 2 on five "-isms."

This part covers determinism, materialism and reductionism. 

First, he notes he rejects contracausal free will. That's kind of a throwaway, though; doesn't any materialist monist?

Second, he does allow for quantum effects, while not overstating them.

The fail comes on reductionism. He rejects greedy reductionism and allows for emergent properties.

He just fails to apply that idea to libertarian free will, my idea of "something like free will" based in part, indirectly, on Dan Dennett, and even more, directly, on Dan Wegner. Indeed, "libertarian free will" or "compatibilism isn't even mentioned.

Massimo could, again, stand to read some Daniel Wegner. EVERYBODY who pushes the false dichotomy of "free will versus determinism" could. 

And that's the rub.

On the other hand, near the end, he notes:

So what’s my position about reductionism? When I was younger I was attracted by the notion of strong emergence, in great part because as an organismal biologist I simply couldn’t see how things like the development of living beings, and even less the complexity of ecosystems, could ever be reduced to physics. Now I’m not so sure, and in fact the more time passes the more I lean toward reductionism and weak emergence.

So, that may be why he's a harder determinist today. 

Another reason? Before you hit the paywall in his part 2, he appears to be more of a positivist than before.